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The place of Equity in modern procedure and in the curriculum in
present day law schools will be discussed in a series of three articles, of
which this is the first.
EQUITY:
SYSTEM OR PROCESS?*
PHILIP A. RYANt
T HE NATURE OF EQUITY has troubled legal scholars for many years.
It has been viewed as a closed but flexible department of our juris-
prudence, and it has been equated with procedure. No matter what the
framework of discussion, however, everyone recognizes a value, intangible
and compelling, which surpasses strict legal rules. This consensus on the
value but disagreement on the nature of Equity invites the effort to obtain
a satisfactory personal insight.
As pointed out by Professor Chafee, "Equity is a way of looking at
the administration of justice."' It is also true that there are different ways
- at least three - of looking at Equity. Each may be necessary and useful,
depending on the problem to be solved. But distinction and differentiation
are important if we are to use the right tools for the right problems.
The first and traditional view is that "Equity is that body of rules
which is administered only by those courts which are known as courts of
Equity."' 2 This is only partially true historically,3 and the truth that is in
the statement does not go beyond giving us a catalog of such rules as are
found in numerous texts and treatises and collections of cases. In this
view, Equity is a "department" or an "established branch of our American
*Reprinted, with permission, from 45 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 213 (1956-1957).
tB.A., Georgetown University (1941); LL.B., Harvard Law School (1948); Pro-
fessor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY iii (Re ed. 1955) (hereinafter cited as Re); see also
Stevens, A Brief on Behalf of a Course in Equity, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 422 (1956), wherein
are discussed the "equitable attitude" and "the equitable way of dealing with a case."
2 MAITLAND, EQUITY 1 (Brunyate ed. 1936), quoted in Glenn and Redden, Equity:
A Visit to the Founding Fathers, in Re 12, 15.
3 See Adams, The Origin of English Equity, in Re 1; Keigwin, The Origin of Equity,
18 GEO. L. J. 15 (1929); Spence, The History of the Court of Chancery, in 2 SELECT
ESSAYS ON ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 219 (1908).
as well as of the English jurisprudence. ' '4
It is in every sense of the word a "system"
to which "it is impossible that any new gen-
eral principles should be added. . . ."5 It is
thought that to go further would turn the
Chancellor into a legislator - which indeed
he once was - contrary to the spirit of the
times and the constitutional separation of
powers.6 However, the principles embraced
in the system are said to possess "an inherent
capacity of expansion, so as to keep abreast
of each succeeding generation and age." 7
This view necessarily limits the capacity of
Equity, as a tool for a more perfect admin-
istration of justice, to the inherent potency
of the general principles already encom-
passed within the "system." 8 It remains to
be seen whether that is all the potency we
need.
But leaving aside for the moment the
validity of this view, it nevertheless gives us
a useful tool for determining such an issue
as the right to jury trial. To quote Professor
Chafee: "There is only one genuine reason
today for distinguishing an action at law
from a suit in equity - the constitutional
right to jury trial in civil cases."9
4 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 46 (5th
ed. 1941).
5 lid. § 60.
6 Cf. 1 id. § 35; 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 19 (14thed. 1918).
7 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 67 (5th
ed. 1941).
s Ibid.:
Its great underlying principles, which are the
constant source, the never-failing roots, of its par-
ticular rules, are unquestionably principles of
right, justice, and morality, so far as the same can
become the elements of a positive human juris-
prudence; and these principles, being once incor-
porated into the system, and being essentially un-
limited, have communicated their own vitality and
power of adaptation to the entire branch of the
national jurisprudence of which they are, so to
speak, the substructure.
9 Re iv.
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As Pomeroy and others have reiterated,
this system of principles is flexible enough
to meet the needs of the times. As it is
handed down to us, however, it may need
elucidation, and the judges may need prod-
ding to use to the fullest its marvelous adap-
tability. Old principles may need explana-
tion, and, upon occasion, a long-accepted
principle may turn out to be in conflict with
another principle of the system. This eluci-
dation and prodding generally come from
those steeped in the "system" in the best
sense of the word. Witness Pound's mas-
terful analysis' 0 of the dictum of Gee v.
Pritchard" that Equity would protect only
property rights, and his arguments against
this maxim as an absolute. Some years later
we find the matter being clarified in a case
in the District of Columbia in which Judge
Edgerton stated:
The doctrine that equity jurisdiction is
limited to the protection of property rights
conflicts with the familiar principle that
equity may give preventive relief when the
legal remedy of money damages, if available
at all, is inadequate to redress a wrong.12
In brief, the view that Equity is a closed
system with an inherent capacity for flexible
adaptation to new needs is productive of
fruitful results in limited areas. The difficulty
remains whether such a view is adequate in
a time when it may be said that "legislators
are properly preoccupied with public affairs;
they have little time to spend on curing de-
fects in private law."13
A second way of looking at Equity in-
volves us directly in the classical jurispru-
dential debate between Langdell-Ames-
Maitland and Spence-Pomeroy-Hohfeld on
10 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation
and Injuries to Personality, in Re 364.
11 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818).
12 Berrien v. Pollitzer, 83 U.S. App. D.C. 23, 24,
165 F.2d 21, 22 (1947).
1- Re iv (Foreword by Chafee).
EQUITY
whether Equity did or did not conflict with
the common law. 14 With the fusion of law
and Equity, this seemingly theoretical de-
bate has become important for the practic-
ing lawyer.
Should a complaint under a code-merger
system of pleading be dismissed if the theory
-of the complaint is an equitable action for
partnership accounting which fails of proof
at trial, but the facts proved show a hiring
and agreement to pay for services? In
Jackson v. Strong,15 the court dismissed the
complaint:
The inherent and fundamental differences
between actions at law and suits in equity
14 The substance of this debate is best derived
from the words of the debaters themselves. Lang-
dell:
Shutting our eyes then to the fact that equitable
rights are a fiction, and assuming them to have an
actual existence, what is their nature, what is their
extent, and what is the field which they occupy?
1. They must not violate the law. 2. They must
follow the analogy of one or more classes of legal
rights. 3. There is no exclusive field for them to
occupy; for the entire field is occupied by legal
rights. Legal and equitable rights must, therefore,
exist side by side, and the latter cannot interfere
with, or in any manner affect, the former. Lang-
dell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs, 13
HARV. L. REV. 659, 673 (1900); quoted in Cook,
Equitable Defenses, in Re 38, 40, n.8.
Hohfeld:
[]n case of conflict, as distinguished from con-
currence, a jural relation is finally determined' by
the equitable rule rather than by the legal.
1. Since in any sovereign state, there must, in
the last analysis, be but a single system of genuine
law, since the various principles and rules of that
system must be consistent with one another, and
since, accordingly, all genuine jural relations must
be consistent with one another, two conflicting
rules, the one "legal" and the other "equitable,"
cannot be valid and determinative to the exclusion
of the other. Hohfeld, The Relations Between
Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. REV. 537, 557
(1913); quoted in Cook, Equitable Defenses, in
Re 38, 42 n.16.
15222 N.Y. 149, 118 N.E. 512 (1917). For a dis-
cussion of the case, see Kharas, A Century of Law-
Equity Merger in New York, in Re 65, 75.
cannot be ignored .... If a party can allege
one cause of action and then recover upon
another, his complaint would serve no use-
ful purpose."' 16
This argument "seems to be based . . . on
an idea that under the code we still have
'courts of law' and 'courts of equity.' 17
This, of course, is not true under a merged
system, and the decision seems to stem from
the Langdell view that equitable rights are
a fiction. If this is true, no legal cause of
action being stated, there was nothing for
the judicial powers to operate upon, regard-
less of what was proved.
Certainly there are differences between
law and Equity as historically developed. As
pointed out, we must know these differences
as long as our society preserves the right to
jury trial in legal actions. But is there a con-
flict between the two? Long ago in the great
quarrel between Coke and Ellesmere it was
thought that there was, and Equity emerged
as the superior system.' But in later times
legal semanticists have said that there was
no such conflict and that "legal and equit-
able rights must, therefore, exist side by
side, and the latter cannot interfere with, or
in any manner affect, the former."' 9 Others,
looking at our jurisprudence as a whole and
relying on the principle of contradiction,
have said that we have one system made up
of legal and equitable rights and that where
the two conflict the equitable right is para-
mount. 20 Where law and Equity are sepa-
16222 N.Y. at 154, 118 N.E. at 513.
17 Cook, Equitable Defenses, in Re 38, 44.
18 For an account of this dispute, see WILSON, LIFE
OF JAMES I 94-95 (1653), reprinted in ScOTT &
SIMPSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON JUDI-
CIAL REMEDIES 605-06 (2d ed. 1946).
19 Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs,
13 HARV. L. REV. 659, 673 (1900); quoted in
Cook, Equitable Defenses, in Re 38, 40 n.8.
20For example, when a binding contract for the
sale of land has been made, the vendee is said to
be the owner in Equity, i.e., he has equitable title.
rately administered, the only difficulty in
giving recognition to the superior equitable
right is procedural; where fusion has been
attempted, imperfect procedural processes
and lack of appreciation of the superiority
of Equity are the main obstacles..2 '
This brings us to a third way of looking
at Equity. What is the essence of Equity?
It is certainly far from satisfying to be told
that it is a body of rules administered by
courts of Equity in England prior to the
Judicature Acts which took effect in 1875.
Our appreciation is still incomplete even if
we could speak from memory all the princi-
ples and rules which determine equitable
causes; indeed, even if we could recognize
their intrinsic and universal moral worth as
well. What is necessary is to have some ade-
quate grasp of Equity as a built-in dyna-
mism necessary for progress in any system
which purports to administer justice. In a
time when distinctions between legal and
equitable actions have been abolished and
the Chancellor is not standing by to super-
vise, correct, and supplement the adminis-
tration of strict law, such an inquiry be-
comes very important.
As Professor Emmerglick has pointed
out, separate Equity courts provided indi-
vidualized justice by the use of a well-
The law courts would recognize only the vendor
as the owner. However, in "net substantive legal
effect," to use Cook's phrase (Cook, Equitable
Defenses, in Re 38, 47), the vendee is the owner,
since he may call upon a court of Equity to force
the vendor to convey. Under the law as a whole,
i.e., common law and Equity, there can be only
one owner as between the two claimants. The con-
flict is resolved in favor of the vendee inasmuch as
he can get specific performance, a remedy not
possessed by the common law and which it is
powerless to prevent. See supra note 14.
21 See Cook, Equitable Defenses, in Re 38, 44;
Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New
York, in Re 65, 75.
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tempered judicial discretion illuminated by
moral principles. "Moral concepts were, first
made into equitable principles and then into
rules of law"2 2 when their inherent persua-
sive force coerced acceptance by courts of
law. In this view, Equity is a mode of giving
morality a juridical character.2 3 This view
presupposes that there is some objective
morality which needs only a strong and duly
authorized Chancellor to be made effective
and operative in a particular case. Equity in
the abstract, therefore, is a process, and the
Chancellor is the human agency to accom-
plish the process. If the general rule of the
strict law does not provide justice, Equity
will step in to fill the gap. Sometimes this
thought is expressed by saying that the
Chancellor enforced "natural justice. '24
This view has been criticized as a "will-of-
the-wisp of Stoic speculation or Grotian
dogma which once held sway over the minds
of men."'25 But even this critic admits that
"in part ... equity represents higher ethical
standards"26 - which seems to be just as
much of a "will-of-the-wisp" as "natural
justice."
Whether the wellspring of Equity be
viewed as "natural justice," "higher ethical
22 Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, in
Re 53, 59.
23 That this was true historically' seems amply
demonstrated by Coing, English Equity and the
Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon Law, .71
L.Q. REv. 223 (1955). At 230-31 the author
states: "The duties of conscience, as determined
by Christian ethics, thus became the standard by
which the judge had to assess the obligations of the
parties. The positive law alone could not be de-
cisive .. " And at 238: "The Chancellors used
their learning of canon law to give a new legal
shape to an existing jurisdiction."
24 1 POMEROY, Equity Jurisprudence § 67 (5th ed.
1941).
25 Patterson, What is Equity?, 9 A.B.A.J. 647
(1923).
26 Id. at 648.
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standards," or the like, we are inevitably
led to philosophic inquiry as to the contents
of such concepts as "justice," "morality,"
"good faith," "honesty," and "conscience"
- ideas which mean much to thinking men
of whatever age or station. These ideas are
intuitively perceived by the great mass of
men, and, while it may be possible to go
far in defining and ordering them in a philo-
sophic system, the important point is that
they are workable concepts even if not pre-
cisely defined. They are "felt necessities,"
to use the phrase of Holmes. And the peo-
ple, not the judges, are the ones who first
"feel" these "necessities" or moral aspira-
tions.
Under the common-law system as it orig-
inated, the opportunity for translating these
felt moral mandates into law was rigidly
circumscribed by jurisdictional and proced-
ural limitations. But even under that system
new principles were planted and grew . 2 The
Chancellor was much more successful in im-
proving the law, although in consulting his
own conscience and making his decree
equivalent to arbitrium boni viri, he was sub-
ject to the criticism that Equity varied with
27 E.g., Case of the Humber Ferry, Y.B. 22 Assizes
9 (1348). Keigwin calls this case "a very sensa-
tional advance upon the older law; but it does not
appear that the court took this step upon the
recommendation of any dignitary dispensing the
equity of that day." Keigwin, The Origin of Equity,
18 GEO. L.J. 299, 326 (1930). His comment clear-
ly indicates the view that Equity is a process for
the improvement of the law and that the particular
way in which this process is put into operation (by
the Chancellor under the older system; by a uni-
fied court under the newer system), is not so im-
portant as the process actually being in operation.
For a modern example of judicial improvement of
purely "legal" doctrine, see MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916),
opinion by Cardozo, J., and the discussion of this
case by Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law
of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REV. 372, 376 (1939).
the length of the Chancellor's foot. The
exercise of discretion necessarily injects a
certain degree of uncertainty into the law,
but if that is the price of progress, we must
live with it. The system which is most certain
is the system which is completely static. It is
still possible for men to plan their affairs
with adequate certainty, even though they
are subject to review by courts anxious to
do the most perfect justice according to the
present state of moral knowledge. Further,
knowledge of such review would cause in-
creased speculation and awareness as to
what is right and what is wrong under given
circumstances. In other words, all citizens
have the duty to be good citizens. Ignorance
of the law does not excuse in the criminal
field; it is not going too far to require good
faith and conscience as factors in all civil
transactions, and to employ them as stand-
ards of decision when these transactions are
subjected to the judicial power.
There has been no recent attempt, how-
ever, to connect Equity with a moral system
which everyone recognizes and accepts. Per-
haps this is too great a task in this time of
divergent philosophies. Only the earlier
Chancellor had no trouble equating Equity
with morals. And that was in a time when,
in the main, there was but one philosophy,
that of the Western world into which had
been drawn the best of the Roman, Greek,
and Judaic traditions as refined by Christi-
anity.
Some twenty years ago Max Radin vrote
a brilliant essay in which he traced the histor-
ical and conceptual development of Equity
as a legal dynamism from the bautixta
of Aristotle through its Roman manifesta-
tion, aequitas to its English formalization.
He showed that to Aristotle LeLItLUW was a
"straightening out of the law in those places
where if fails because of its general char-
acter." 2s It is different from and superior to
justice according to law. This is "a logical
conceptI sufficiently abstracted from...
time and space to be as much entitled to the
epithet of eternal as law itself."'29 But,
... in ordinary Greek, gaLE xS1a become al-
most unqualifiedly the virtue which we have
in mind when we say "kindness" or "clem-
ency," of which the hesed of the Old Testa-
ment, the XAtQig of St. Paul, are extreme
and one might say ... exaggerated forms.30
While the Romans gave 6tnixEta the pop-
ular meaning of clementia or misericordia,
their development of aequitas, the aequum
et bonum, was not equated with clementia.
The quality of compassion was put to one
side and Roman aequitas accepted "the
function which Aristotle declared n8xEsa
to perform, that of straightening out the law
and filling its ellipses."'' l According to
Radin, Roman aequitas gave justice "a new
goal to'climb to," and did not, "like the
popular gatmeLa sacrifice consistency to...
compassion. '32
In its original form in England, Equity
was not fettered by any procedural distinc-
tion from law. Thus:
The early common law courts which
boasted of giving a writ for any demand cer-
tainly administered what they, as well as
canonists and civilians, would have called
equity. But toward the end of the thirteenth
century this power of giving writs became
restricted and courts could no longer profess
that the law they announced was still flexible
enough to follow the path of equity, even
when the path was clear.
It was under such circumstances that
direct application, made to the council and
28 Radin, A Juster Justice, A More Lawful Law,
in LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN Kip
McMuRRAY 537, 541 (Radin ed. 1935).
29 Id. at 542.
30 Id. at 545.
31 Id. at 551.
32 Id. at 555.
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chancellor for a relief that the law did not
give, could put itself on a little stronger basis
than a mere clamor for an act of grace ...
The king's courts proper had given up their
power to transform law into equity. And the
idea of equity thus abandoned by its proper
parents could therefore be absorbed by the
newer and more malleable jurisdiction of
the chancellor.33
And.conceptually English Equity
began as a real ktmLeta, a reservation of the
power in the king's council to make excep-
tions in the name of mercy and compassion.
The chancery extended and regularized its
jurisdiction, rationalized and organized it
or part of it, and proceeded as though
Roman aequitas and Greek ht%×Eia were
the same. 34
This coupling of Equity as a supplement
to the common law and Equity as an appeal
for compassion gave English Equity a
unique character in its origin. Later it per-
formed solely a supplementary function
which became systematized, with the result
that a hardening process set in. Thus the
true spirit of Equity, in many instances and
over long periods, did not illuminate and
animate the bench and bar as in its earlier
days. This has not gone unobserved. 35
One of the great deterrents to the equit-
able growth of our law and to an under-
standing of Equity in the abstract has been
the cart-before-the-horse idea that in Anglo-
American jurisprudence remedies create
rights. Unless the common law is completely
irrational, there must be some principle of
decision, right or wrong, before there can be
any decision at all. In more ancient times,
no writ could have been procured from the
33 Id. at 560.
34 Id. at 562.
35 Many of the articles in Re demonstrate this. In
addition, see Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5
COLUM. L. REV. 20 (1905);'Radin, supra note 28,
at 563; Stevens, A Brief on Behalf of a Course in
Equity, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 422 (1956).
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Chancery unless the Chancellor saw some
merit or morality in the plaintiff's applica-
tion.
This idea, however, has lately received
new expression in England. Sir Raymond
Evershed, M.R., in a lecture on the fusion
of law and Equity, first mentioned the pro-
vision of the Judicature Act of 1873 which
provided:
Generally in all matters not hereinbefore
particularly mentioned in which there is any
conflict or variance between the rules of
equity and the rules of common law with
reference to the same matter, the rules of
equity shall prevail. 36
Sir Raymond stated that it was erroneous
to interpret this as meaning a right in the
new court
to apply and, where necessary, to extend the
rules of equity as to supersede the rules of
common law, and by use of the equitable
remedies, particularly the remedy of injunc-
tion, to create altogether new rights even
though they involve the supersession of well-
established common law principles.3 7
And further:
The function of equity was not.., to destroy
or supersede but to fulfill the common law;
not so much to correct it as to perfect it.
... [A]nd, in performing its function, the
main contribution which equity had to make
. . . was by way of the . . . remedies it
provided. 38
Implicit in this statement are two notions:
first, that fulfillment can always be had
without supersession; and, secondly, that
the only thing the Chancellor had to offer
was such weapons as the injunction. The
first is not necessarily true as a logical matter
and was questioned by Sir Henry Maine as
36 Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 VICT. c. 66,
§ 25(11).
37 Evershed, Reflections on the Fusion of Law and
Equity After 75 Years, 70 L.Q. REV. 326, 326-27
(1954).
38 Id. at 328.
a practical matter. 30 Concerning the second,
it may be stated that the Chancellor had
something much more fundamental to offer.
He could propose the right view of the case,
deriving this view from a storehouse of
moral principles which the common law
either could not or would not use, or would
not use extensively. This was his most im-
portant contribution, and the remedy he
devised was only a means of making his
determination effective. His "law" preceded
his remedy.
Sir Raymond elaborates his ideas further
in his lecture. One passage in particular is
well worth quoting:
[W]ith our system the influence of the
remedy is of very great importance because
of the absence of any code of rights. With
equity this has been of most remarkable
significance. Let me remind you of the
speech of Lord Parker in ...Sinclair v.
Brougham, where he pointed out that, in
the course of the growth of equity, what had
started as being no more than the grant in
a number of similar cases of a particular
remedy had ended in the creation of rights
-a principle of which perhaps the most
obvious instance is the trust.40
Of course, the answer to this is that some
principle must have guided the Chancellor
in his decision to provide the remedy in the
first of the line of similar cases. If this were
not true, he would not have been acting
rationally.
Closely allied to the doctrine that equi-
table remedies created equitable rights is
the view that identifies the essence of Equity
with a system of remedies. 41 It is true that
'" MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 65-69 (3d Am. ed. 1887).
40 Evershed, supra note 37, at 331. Lord Parker's
speech is reported in Sinclair v. Brougham, [1914]
A.C. 398, 441-42.
41 Bordwell, The Resurgence of Equity, 1 U. Cm.
L. REV. 741 (1934). In speaking of fusion, he
states at 747:
In an indiscriminate "fusing," or an indiscrim-
Equity is a process, but it is a process of a
far broader and more important kind than
procedure, even when this is taken in its
widest possible sense. Equity viewed as a
process accomplished the conversion of
morality into law; procedure is merely the
inate borrowing, these principles are likely to be
lost. . . . [T]hat the ethical tone which marked
equity at its best should be lost, would be a great
harm. That the principles guiding the adminis-
tration of equitable relief should be lost would
be a calamity. There is room for both law and
equity in the legal system.
So far so good, but farther on, at 749, the author
reverts to the idea that rights are created by reme-
dies when, in speaking of the proper place of
Equity in the legal curriculum, he states: "[P]lace
equity where it belongs and where it has always
belonged, under Procedure.... [Tihe driving force
of equity has always been procedure and will re-
main such." Professor Bordwell recognizes, at 748,
the dynamic character of Equity as the "forward
element in the law," but the identification of
Equity with procedure or remedies is unfortunate.
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means of recognizing the conversion in a
particular case, be it frequent or infrequent
in type. Hence Equity is different from and
superior to procedure, just as it was proved
the superior of the rigid common law. Equity
is a dynamic factor which must pervade all
branches of our substantive law, Torts, Con-
tracts, Property, and the like, if the law is
to progress.
While the historical development and dif-
ferentiation of law and Equity must ever be
kept in view by the American lawyer, it is
also essential to bear in mihd a clear notion
of Equity as a dynamic process, stripped of
its accidental historical growth in Anglo-
American law. Only in this way can Equity,
in this time of procedural identification with
law, be made to perform its necessary and
salutary function. The capacity to do equity
should be regarded as an inherent attribute
of judicial power.
